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2026
No country for fast growth: America’s slowdown
How is the US economy faring under President Donald Trump? One year ago, the data did not allow us to come up with a clear verdict. Although his “liberation day” tariffs had triggered a large slump in business hiring and investment plans by injecting a massive dose of uncertainty last April, his subsequent reversal helped sentiment to recover somewhat. But nearly a year and a half into Trump’s second presidency, his impact on the economy is -- in most cases – getting clearer.
Harsh path for Kevin Warsh
Less than a month left: Nothing moves in a straight line under Trump 2.0, and that includes the path for Kevin Warsh to succeed the current Fed Chair, Jerome Powell. In a smooth-transition world, Warsh would attend his confirmation hearing before the Senate Banking Committee (scheduled for today), get confirmed before May 15 (Powell’s last day as a Chair), take office on May 16, and get a head start on fixing an “asset- rich, income-poor U.S. economy.” Well, we certainly do not live in a world where transitions are smooth and rules-based order run like clockwork. The Senate Banking Committee (with a narrow 13-11 Republican ma- jority) will most likely block President Donald Trump’s nominee, Kevin Warsh -- courtesy of Republican Sen- ator Thom Tillis, who will likely join the 11 Democrats on the panel to delay the approval as long as the De- partment of Justice’s criminal investigation into Powell is ongoing. At the moment, it seems unlikely that the investigation into Powell (related to the Fed’s renovation of its headquarters and Powell’s testimony on this matter) will be wrapped up anytime soon. Just last Tuesday, members of Jeanine Pirro’s team (the US attorney for the District of Columbia who opened the investigation into Powell) made an unannounced visit to the construction site at the Fed’s headquarters. The next day, Trump threatened once again to fire Powell if he does not leave the Fed after his term as Chair ends. In the event that the Senate does not confirm Warsh by May 15, Powell indicated last month that he will continue to serve as Chair on a temporary basis until Warsh arrives. The Trump administration will most likely challenge this (even though it does not have a strong legal case) and try to appoint someone else as Chair (Vice Chair Philip Jefferson? or maybe Governor Christopher Waller?). The harsh path for Kevin Warsh as the next Fed Chair -- and the likely legal battles that will accom- pany it -- could revive the “threats to Fed independence trade”: a weaker dollar and higher rates at the long end of the yield curve. So far, our forecast for a 25 bp rate cut in June holds, a call we have maintained since Powell's Jackson Hole speech last August. But the risk now is that if new leadership under Warsh does not take hold by mid-June, the Fed could delay that 25 bp rate cut and maintain a “wait-and-see” stance instead -- especially if volatility in energy prices resurfaces
US tariff policy: what next?
Moving on: The Supreme Court ruling against US President Donald Trump’s “liberation day” tariffs on 20 February has shown that the president’s power over tariffs has limits. As a result, Trump no longer holds the same tariff leverage to secure trade and investment deals with US trading partners. Although elevated tariff rates hurt US growth last year and dented consumer sentiment, Trump has not given up on his protectionist trade policies. Shortly after the court ruling, he imposed 10% global flat tariffs (sector-specific tariffs remain in play and the court ruling did not affect them). These new 10% tariffs under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 against all US trading partners serve as temporary measures, and are valid until late July. They act as a placeholder while Trump prepares to launch “plan B” tariffs. We expect the new tariffs to be, on average, not quite as high as the ones that the court had invalidated. Otherwise, the domestic backlash against the inflationary consequences of tariffs could get worse for Trump and his Republicans ahead of the midterm elections on 3 November.
Warshonomics unpacked
From one lawyer to another: Pending Senate confirmation, Kevin Warsh will succeed current Fed Chair Je- rome Powell as soon as Powell’s term ends on May 15. Like Powell, he is a lawyer by training, but unlike Powell, he has strong incentives and ambitions to “shake things up” at the Fed. Like all other candidates for the Fed Chair job, he favors lower rates (not much of a surprise here). What sets him apart is his strong desire for a leaner Fed balance sheet. Warsh wants the Fed to play a reduced role in the financial markets and not sustain an “asset-rich, income-poor” economy that would fuel inequality. We are sympathetic to this idea -- the Fed’s bloated balance sheet (see Chart 1) did play a role in containing financial risks and helping Wall Street thrive while Main Street continued to struggle. However, Fed plumbing and the liquidity regulations are too complicated (and have gotten even more so since the Fed switched from a scarce reserve framework to ample reserves in 2019) for the Fed to shrink its balance sheet abruptly without rewriting regulations and changing the framework. Doing so could easily cause a crisis in the short-term funding markets – especially when overnight reverse repo facilities at the Fed are near zero and bank reserves are already on life support from the Fed’s reserve management purchases. In short, without rewriting the playbook, the Fed cannot shrink its balance sheet suddenly without “breaking anything.” Markets would probably sniff out any clumsy attempts and penalize them by moving away from US assets, resulting in a weaker dollar. The risk of such an adverse market reaction could stop such attempts in their tracks
US: uneasy growth
Still resilient growth thanks to fiscal juice: A crackdown on immigration, higher tariffs and the erosion of trust in institutions – the trio of US President Donald Trump’s most effective economic policies (plus the uncertainty they created) – are bad for the US. As a result, we revised down our estimate of the US trend growth rate from 2.0% to 1.5% in mid-2025. Of course, lower potential does not mean that actual growth will immediately slow. Expansionary fiscal policy will likely lift growth by more than 0.5ppt this year. The Fed’s policy rate may be above its own assessment of “neutral”, but accommodative financial conditions suggest monetary policy is not meaningfully restrictive. With fiscal policy juicing the economy and monetary policy not counteracting it, the US should expand at an above-trend rate of just above 2% this year.
US: Powell, political pressure, pushback
Fed’s independence back in focus once again: 2025 ended the year on a positive note… at least regarding the Fed’s independence. The Board announced on 11 December the reappointment of regional Fed presidents, a key event, as the Fed’s credibility could face serious risk without such reappointment (see more: No free lunch if you fire the Cook). Just as things seemed stable, Chair Jerome Powell announced yesterday that the Department of Justice threatened the Fed with a criminal indictment related to his testimony before the Sen- ate last June. Powell explained later in his statement that: “The threat of criminal charges is a consequence of the Federal Reserve setting interest rates based on our best assessment of what will serve the public, rather than following the preferences of the President.” This marks the first time Powell has openly confronted Trump about the Fed’s independence. As we have highlighted many times, a Fed that aligns more closely with politics could trigger higher-for-longer inflation, possibly negative real rates at the short end of the curve, elevated long-term borrowing rates and a weaker dollar. Powell’s statement shows that he is not ready to back down, but he will remain Fed Chair only until May 2026. June, when we expect the first Fed rate cut of the year, looks set to be a key month, possibly marked by high volatility in June or beforehand.
The US economy in 2026: no more fireworks
Where is the US economy heading in 2026? My two cents: growth cools a bit, inflation stays stubborn, and the labor market remains broadly balanced. That likely means the Fed only has room for one rate cut -- probably around June.
2025
America’s wealth-driven, bifurcated consumer base
Wall Street versus “Main Street”: Many news articles about the US consumer highlight the “K-shaped” story: high- income households feel great and continue to increase their consumption while low-income households stay in a terrible mood and barely get by. This trend is not new, the US consumer base has long been “bifurcated”. However, since the COVID-19 pandemic, the gap has deepened. As the Fed fell behind the curve and failed to put the post- pandemic inflation bunny back into the hat, high and persistent rises in consumer prices acted as a heavy tax on the poor. Meanwhile, the Fed more than doubled its balance sheet from $4.2trn at the start of 2020 to $8.9trn by mid-June 2022 through a massive quantitative easing programme. Households at the top wealth decile, which hold nearly 90% of equity market wealth and feel less pressure from inflation, benefited from rising asset prices. In other words, “Wall Street” thrived while “Main Street” struggled
US: When the shutdown stops
Guess who is back: The US government shutdown, now in its 43rd day, looks set to end this week. It will enter history as the longest shutdown ever, surpassing the 34-day closure in late 2018 during President Don- ald Trump’s first term. Longer shutdowns, higher tariffs and harsher immigration policies – Trump 2.0 con- tinues to weigh more heavily on economic growth than in his first term. If the House of Representatives, where Republicans hold a slim majority, approves the temporary funding measure passed by the Senate on Monday, most federal agencies will be able to resume spending until 30 January 2026. Some agencies, in- cluding the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Food and Drug Admin- istration, can do so until 30 September 2026. Once the House passes the measure, President Trump must sign it, but his support for ending the shutdown makes that step almost certain. As the shutdown ends, gov- ernment data releases will resume, GDP should normalise after a modest hiccup (with the Q4 drag mostly reversing in Q1) and money markets should also face less stress
US inflation expectations: anchored, for now
Fed’s kryptonite: Long-term inflation expectations matter a great deal to the Fed. A de-anchoring of expectations would not only make it harder to bring inflation back to the 2% target, but it would also breach the Fed’s third mandate to maintain “moderate long-term interest rates.” If inflation expectations were to rise toward 3%, the Fed may have to raise its policy rate corridor even in a weak labour market. As stated in the Fed’s 2025 statement on longer-run goals: “ The Committee is prepared to act forcefully to ensure that longer-term inflation expectations remain well anchored.”
US: In debt we trust
Borrow, bloat, stay afloat: The US is a fiscal sinner, with public debt on an unsustainable path. Even after accounting for tariff revenue, the federal debt held by the public is on track to rise from its current level of 100% of GDP to 120% in less than a decade (see Chart 1). We expect the deficit to end this year at 6.4% of GDP (after 6.9% last year), and to remain at about this level in the coming years. The last time the US government ran a budget deficit this big or bigger was during the COVID-19 pandemic, and before that, during the 2008 financial crisis. So far, bets on Fed rate cuts and the expectation of a "one-off" tariff impact on the price level have kept the 10-year Treasury yield flirting at about 4% despite an alarming fiscal outlook. However, as the crackdown on immigration pushes inflation expectations higher and the Fed steps on the brakes after the 29 October meeting, while investors continue to lose trust in US institutions, we expect the 10-year Treasury yield to gradually approach 4.8% by the end of next year
US: jobless expansion
Rising without hiring: After a more subdued growth rate in the first half of the year (1.6% annualised), the Atlanta Fed projects an annualised surge of 3.8% in real GDP in Q3 to bring the yoy rate to 2.2% after 2.1% in Q2. However, even the current strength in economic activity does not come with employment gains. Since April, private employment excluding healthcare has lost nearly 100k jobs, and total hours worked have not increased since March. The absence of job gains alongside solid economic activity points to productivity growth. That said, it is still unclear whether this will turn into a lasting productivity boom – or remain a flash in the pan. Ultimately, President Donald Trump's agenda of sky-high tariffs, erratic policymaking and an immigration crackdown will weigh on growth, just as it already has on the labour market. We expect real GDP growth to fall short of 2% yoy in the years ahead, as bad policies will likely more than offset the productivity gains from artificial intelligence.
US: making room for the AI boom
Betting it all on AI: President Donald Trump's ultra-restrictive immigration policies have set the US up for a future with a stagnant labour force, and possibly even a shrinking one. Without an inflow of workers supporting US GDP growth, rises in productivity must do all the heavy lifting. The macro data point to a clear bet: the US has pinned its hopes for productivity gains on artificial intelligence (AI). While AI could indeed become a game-changer and sustain the near-3% annual real GDP growth the US has enjoyed since the pandemic, if it fails to deliver productivity gains on par with computers or electricity, the US will likely face a long-run growth rate below 2%. That said, for now, the AI hype shields the economy to some extent from the impact of tariffs, uncertainty and elevated interest rates, as investment in the sector remains relatively inelastic (see Charts 1-6). The immigration crackdown, tariffs and the erosion of institutions have lowered US trend growth to 1.5%; so far, the effects of AI on the overall economy (outside of AI-related investment) seem too small to offset this.
US: no free lunch if you fire the Cook
Political pressure cooker: President Donald Trump's attacks on the Fed's independence do not seem to let up. He started with insults to Fed Chair Jerome Powell and now his focus has shifted to Fed Governor Lisa Cook and her mortgage issues. Interfering with the Fed's independence is a dangerous game, especially if politics forces the Fed to cut rates despite rising inflation. If Trump's strong-arm tactics against Fed officials continue, the US will eventually pay for this with a weaker dollar and higher long-term borrowing costs. The 30-year Treasury yield jumped nearly 5bp following Trump's claim that he has fired Governor Cook (see Chart 1). The Fed only controls the short end of the yield curve. Where long-term rates end up depends on the bond market. Weak Fed credibility and rate cuts amid rising inflation pressures are a perfect recipe for higher long-term inflation expectations. Continued threats to the Fed's independence could further raise the risk premium on US assets. Together, higher long-term inflation expectations and risk premia mean that long-term borrowing costs will probably not come down, even if the Fed cuts rates. In a world with a politicised Fed, the future is likely a steeper yield curve (see Chart 2), where politics suppress short-term rates but economic fundamentals keep long-term rates high.
US: making sense of the job revisions
No need to sweat over revisions: The 258k aggregate downward revision to the job gains in the prior two months in the July nonfarm payroll (NFP) report – the largest downward revision since 1990, outside of the COVID-19 pandemic – raised eyebrows about both the quality of the data and the health of the US labour market. We addressed the health concerns immediately after the nonfarm payroll release (see: Payrolls and the Fed: digging deeper into the data) – now we take a look at the data quality. While the -258k revision shocked many, the historical patterns suggest that we are highly unlikely to see similar monthly revisions in the near future. Since the Federal Reserve (Fed) began its most aggressive tightening cycle since the 1980s in March 2022, monthly non-benchmark revisions to NFP gains have not landed at the extreme end of the historical range (see the black line in Chart 1). Yes, revisions have skewed downward (see the orange line in Chart 1), but jumping to conclusions based solely on downward revisions during the pandemic or the 2008 global financial crisis – while ignoring upward revisions in the 1980, 1990, and 2001 recessions – misreads the data. Downward revisions are not inherently procyclical. Forecasting a major economic downturn based on them would simply add to the long list of labour market indicators that predicted a recession in 2023 and 2024, which never materialised.
Fed watch: no longer a snoozefest
September cut not a done deal: With less than a month left until the Jackson Hole Economic Symposium on 30-31 August, ahead of the next Federal Reserve (Fed) meeting on 17 September, markets are looking for dovish forward guidance after last Friday's weak July nonfarm payrolls report. They will almost certainly receive some from Fed Governors Christopher Waller (one of the frontrunners for the next Fed chair) and Michelle Bowman (recently promoted by President Donald Trump to serve as the Fed's Vice Chair for Supervision), who voted for a 25bp cut in the 30 July meeting. A few others may join them as the 258k downward revisions to employment gains in May and June showed that the labour market was not as solid as previously thought. However, we expect the majority of the 12 voting members, including Chair Jerome Powell, to remain neutral for now and refrain from signalling a cut in September. Core inflation is on track to exceed 3% yoy by the end of the summer and the feed-through of President Trump's tariffs to inflation is just getting started (see: Tariffs starting to bite). The labour market remains in balance on many measures despite tepid employment gains of late (see: Payrolls and Fed: digging deeper into data). While uncertainty regarding trade policies has eased a bit recently, it remains much higher than before Trump's return to the White House. As a result, we still see a slightly-better-than-even chance for our long-held call that the Fed will stay put in September.
Payrolls and the Fed: digging deeper into the data
Last Friday's disappointing July nonfarm payroll report can arguably be seen as the worst US jobs report in the postpandemic era. Instead of adding 150k jobs per month, as the previous data had suggested, the modest 73k gain in July and the massive 258k downward revision to the May and June data have lowered the rolling three-month average payroll increases to just 35k. This will affect the discussion at the next US Federal Reserve (Fed) meeting on 17-18 September. Markets have interpreted the weak July jobs report as being reminiscent of last summer, when a series of soft labour market readings led the Fed to cut interest rates by 50bp in September 2024. However, the case for a 25bp Fed cut on 18 September is not clear-cut yet. Not all aspects of the labour market report were weak. The Fed also needs to balance these data against the upward pressure on prices stemming from higher tariffs. We, therefore, still see a slightly-better-than-even chance that the Fed will stay put in September and for the remainder of this year. Of course, an August jobs report (published on 5 September) that exhibits similar weakness to last Friday's would most likely tilt the balance towards a cut – even if July and August inflation data show tariffs pushing inflation above 3%. Below, we dig deeper into the labour data to explain why we are not yet convinced that the Fed will lower rates in September.
Trump/Powell feud: hawkish dreams are made of this
Firing threats; threatening independence: Similar to his back and forth on tariffs, President Donald Trump has threatened to fire Fed chair Jerome Powell several times this year, only to back down later. As we saw with tariffs, threats may not always be literally realised, but they can still have an impact. Betting markets currently assign around 20% odds that Powell will be out as Fed chair this year (including the possibility of his resignation) – see Chart 1. Trump criticises Powell for keeping interest rates too high for too long (hence the nickname "Mr Too Late") and says the Fed needs to cut rates aggressively. We believe these criticisms and political pressure on Powell, together with threats to the Fed's independence, reinforce the case for the higher-for-longer yields narrative. This is also a central element of our Equity Strategy team's "brave new world" framework, which states that, since the pandemic, we have entered a new regime characterised by persistently higher inflation, interest rates and systemic risks.
US: tariff sting at summer's end
The tariff damage is just a few months away: So far, the US labour market and inflation data do not yet reflect the fact that the US average tariff rate has surged from 3% to 14% in less than five months to reach its highest level since the 1930s, while trade policy uncertainty has hit a record high. At first glance, tariffs may appear to have only dented consumer and business sentiment rather than caused real economic damage. However, the stagflationary effect of tariffs is still in the pipeline. We expect clearer signs of tariff damage to emerge in coming months. Inflation will likely accelerate modestly over the summer before reaching c3.5% in late 2025. Hard economic data will likely reflect the tariff damage more clearly in Q4 of this year or possibly early 2026 after revisions.
US consumer outlook: slowing but still going
Several forces will help keep consumption afloat. A resilient labour market should keep real incomes rising, even as tariffs drive prices higher. Household balance sheets still look strong. Personal income tax cuts are on the way. In addition, while the wealth effect has faded, it remains positive higher asset prices still encourage households to spend more. These tailwinds should outweigh the drag from policy uncertainty, tight lending conditions, slowing population growth and the burden from student loan repaymentsUnderstanding trends in US consumer spending is far from simple. One should not rely solely on headlines about poor consumer sentiment or anecdotal evidence to predict a collapse in consumption. Many forecasters anticipated a major pullback in household spending in 2024, citing weak sentiment, rising delinquencies, depleted excess savings, low savings rates and high borrowing costs. They were wrong. The real risk to our forecast of modest consumer spending growth lies in the equity market. High-income consumers do the heavy lifting in US consumption. Their wealth sits in stocks, and their spending moves with the market. Another equity market correction, without a quick rebound, could deal a serious blow to consumer demand and tip the economy toward stagnation.
US fiscal outlook: unsustain-a-bill
Not much of a fiscal stimulus: The long-awaited tax cuts from US President Donald Trump, in the form of what he calls "one big beautiful bill", remain months away from becoming reality. The government will almost certainly deliver less than Trump promised during his 2024 campaign. We expect some modest tax cuts alongside an extension of the 2017 Tax Cut and Jobs Act (TCJA). However, the draft bill currently going through Congress also includes measures to offset the new tax cuts. Along with the planned spending cuts in the reconciliation bill, we estimate that the short-term fiscal impulse will remain limited to 0.4-0.6% of GDP until the end of Trump's term. It will turn negative after 2028-2029. From now until 2034, the total impact will be a headwind to economic growth. The proposed fiscal plans do not change our view that the US economy will grow below trend in 2025 and 2026.
US Fed outlook: On hold — unless the labour market collapses
The Fed faces a difficult decision: Should it pre-emptively cut rates to protect the labour market from the impact of tariffs and heightened uncertainty, or keep rates steady (perhaps even raise them) amid rising inflationary pressures? We still expect the Fed to prioritise inflation over growth. Therefore, it will likely hold the policy rate steady throughout 2025. In contrast, Bloomberg consensus expects two 25bp cuts this year, while futures and swaps markets anticipate three (see Chart 1). We predict that inflation (as measured by the core PCE) will accelerate from its current rate of 2.8% yoy to above 3% in Q3 and end the year at 3.2%. Several factors contribute to this rise: i) near-term inflation expectations are rising (see Chart 6, 7 and 8), ii) businesses will pass tariff costs to consumers through higher prices, iii) a weaker dollar will add to import price inflation, and iv) a tight labour market will place a floor under price increases for services (excluding shelter). The drift even further away from the 2% inflation target will most likely prevent rate cuts. The Fed still views the economy being in solid shape (with the labour market near full employment) despite elevated uncertainty and intensifying headwinds to growth.
US: stubborn inflation
The Fed still has some faith that inflation will return to 2% yoy, primarily due to: i) underlying inflation (ie inflation excluding idiosyncratic price movements) declining faster than headline inflation; ii) statistical flukes (residual seasonality) raising reported inflation in the early months of the year, which should reverse later; iii) ongoing disinflation in the shelter price component, which are set to catch up to deflating market rents; and iv) non-market-based services such as financial services and insurance causing the recent stall in inflation progress. We see several factors exerting upward pressure on inflation: i) tariffs being passed through to higher consumer goods prices; ii) higher wage growth due to restrictive immigration policy; and iii) rising inflation expectations. The last point often receives little attention, but various surveys show that it is becoming increasingly likely for inflation expectations to become "unanchored". The Fed pays as much attention to inflation expectations as it does to labour market and inflation data. We believe that the upside pressures on inflation will only offset, rather than outweigh, the downside pressures. This is because we expect tariffs and deportations to be less severe than what Trump has threatened. However, if overall effective tariff rates were to rise by more than 10ppt, or if deportations were to lead to severe labour shortages, and/or inflation expectations were to become unanchored, inflation could persistently remain above 3% yoy.
US: productivity growth is here to stay
We believe that productivity growth in 2025 will remain strong for the following reasons: i) job gains will no longer be concentrated in low-productivity sectors; ii) expansionary fiscal policy will continue to incentivise capex investment; iii) the labour market will retighten; and iv) new business formations will stay elevated to further increase business dynamism.The pattern of employment growth matters for productivity. In the past two years, non-farm business productivity rose by over 2%, annualised in the US, although more than 70% of private job gains came from the least productive industries: leisure and hospitality (21%); and education and health services (50%). These industries were catching up to massive job losses during the pandemic; however, they seem to be mostly caught up and they should add less jobs in 2025. We estimate that the US could have achieved c3% productivity growth without this shift in employment to lowproductivity industries. We expect employment gains to be more broad-based and not heavily skewed to low-productivity sectors this year. This is a crucial reason why we forecast sustained productivity gains.
US: The end of the manufacturing malaise
We identify two main factors behind the weak readings in the manufacturing sector over the past two years. First, the sharp rise in borrowing costs and tightening credit conditions made business conditions unfavourable, while also discouraging consumers from purchasing big-ticket items. Second, beginning in 2022, consumer spending growth shifted primarily to services because of excessive goods consumption during the pandemic. Looking ahead, we expect four tailwinds for manufacturing: i) Business confidence has surged following Trump's election. Manufacturers are optimistic about their production outlook. ii) Fiscal policy remains expansionary, particularly for manufacturing firms. iii) Equipment spending will receive a boost from the factory building boom of the past three years. iv) The growth in AIrelated investments is strong and ongoing. However, several potential headwinds remain. Businesses face uncertainty regarding near-term economic policies, such as the size and timing of incoming tariffs. Additionally, Trump's restrictive immigration policy risks making labour shortages more severe
2024
Canada’s looming immigration reversal and what it means for interest rates, fixed income and the loonie
The main driver behind the neutral rate in Canada has been the increase in the labour force, which was made possible by immigration. With immigration growth taking a step back, the working-age population and labour force will expand slower than before For investors, the key take-away here is that the Canadian neutral rate will likely drop to around 2 per cent (from the current estimated level of 2.75 per cent) as a result of slower population growth – more than half a percentage point below the 2.625 per cent estimated in the U.S. Therefore, the BoC will need to cut much deeper (and likely faster) than the Federal Reserve in the U.S., just to get monetary policy back to a neutral stance. This not only creates room for more rate cuts and builds a bullish case for Canadian fixed income but it also signals weakness for the Canadian dollar
How to fix Canada's poor productivity performance
Canada’s suffering from low productivity has its remedies. One that Rogers proposes is for Canada to invest in industries that generate the most output per hour worked, such as mining/oil/gas and utilities. Although these two industries have the highest productivity levels, the growth here is not too great, with mining down 0.7 per cent from its level in the fourth quarter of 2019 and utilities down 7.4 per cent. The only productivity gain was in services (and agriculture), which consists of the least productive industries (such as accommodation/food services and retail trade). Other remedies include increasing competition, improving workers’ skills, reducing excessive regulation, redressing long-standing interprovincial trade barriers, matching efficiency in the labour market and, of course, higher business investment.
Looking for a TSX sector that will outperform? This is it
Canada’s uranium companies are looking attractive, as they are set to benefit the most as the demand for uranium outpaces supply in the medium term. Nuclear technology developers and operators in the country will also emerge as winners as domestic investments in nuclear capacity and global demand for reactors pick up.
Retirees have never owned so many equities — and that's a risk for the market
Retirees don’t have the luxury to buy and hold through a market downturn
Why the BoC will be forced into cutting rates sooner - and to lower levels - than most people think
What drives the neutral rate in Canada and where it is heading compared to US?
2023
Canada can't count to a million — and it's skewing the data policymakers need
Underestimating population growth erodes reliability of readings on jobs, housing and productivity